Classic British Flight Sim

thomasburnside wrote: I think the Thunder City Lightnings have proved that one of these aircraft can be flown in civil hands.

NO!

As an ex-AOC postholder, the excerpts from the report below are pretty convincing evidence of an incompetent organisation not in compliance with the regualtions to ensure a safe operation. There are many others in the report equally as bad, if not worse.

I used to admire Thunder City for their work in preserving airworthy these ex-Military aircraft, but the evidence suggests a cowboy outfit and an accident waiting to happen.

They stuck that pilot in an unairworthy, improperly maintained aircraft and with an unserviceable ejection seat. Could alnost say Corporate Manslaughter.

Mind you, he shouldn't have been there anyway as his display authorisation had lapsed.

Thunder City operations were reviewed to determine if the organisation had complied
with applicable regulatory requirements during the air show. The evidence found
indicated that two types (Buccaneer and EE Lightning) aircraft of Thunder City
participated in the air show. Thunder City ability to properly manage the operations of
aircraft and pilot flying were inadequate. The SACAA conducted a renewal audit at
Thunder City on 4 April 2009 and highlighted safety and quality was a problem inside
the organisation. It was determined that Thunder City had no safety and quality policy
in place, thus requested to do the necessary rectification actions within 90 days.
There was no proof that Thunder City complied with the conclusion of the AOC audit
report. Thunder City continued to operate without rectifying the audit findings.

The AMO was required to appoint a person responsible for Quality Control who will
be responsible for matters affecting airworthiness and aviation safety. The evidence
found showed that the AMO did not have a Senior Person (Quality Manager) or
Group of Senior Persons (Quality Inspectors) nominated to be accountable for the
Quality Control System. The result was that the Quality Control activities were
inadequately implemented. The AMO maintenance processes were negatively
affected by the situation.

The AMO was required to ensure that personnel in all technical departments
are of sufficient number, experienced and have been given appropriate
authority to be able to discharge their allocated responsibilities. To ensure
there is full and efficient coordination between departments and within
department in respect of airworthiness matters. Also, the AMO had to ensure
that all maintenance personnel received initial and continuation training which
was appropriate to the assigned tasks and responsibilities. Added too was
that the AMO had to keep up to date all relevant documentation pertaining to
the maintenance personnel. But the evidence found showed that the
identified requirements were not complied with; and that the same noncompliances
were identified in past audit findings.

The AMO was not receiving any technical support from the aircraft
manufacturer. The result was that the AMO became solely responsible for
the aircraft airworthiness. The type was declared obsolete during 1976 by the
manufacturer, which meant that a whole lot of surplus spare parts became
available. Thunder City purchased all the spare parts which they could obtain
from the RAF and kept them in their storage facility. Majority of the parts in
the stores were determined to be beyond their shelf life limit. The AMO
procedure was to carry out a visual inspection of the parts to verify
serviceability prior to fitting. There was stores control problems (e.g. tools
missing and aircraft parts not issued through the store system) which the
AMO clearly had difficulty to adequately manage.

Thunder City’s decision to authorise that the aircraft be operated with deferred
defects. The canopy system inspections which was not carried out. The
ejection seats maintenance that was extended to a later date, to allow
sufficient time to participate in the air show. The explosive cartridges of the
ejection seats which life cycle had expired but were extended to accommodate
the aircraft participating in the air show. The aircraft being operated with an
invalid Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) due to it expiring.

The Accountable Manager, Management Personnel, Certifying Inspectors and all
other role player involved employed by Thunder City AMO were displaying poor
management and workmanship qualities. All the parties were equally responsible for
ensuring that the aircraft was appropriately maintained in accordance with
applicable regulations. They all neglected to identify, analyse and prevent unsafe
conditions in the organisation.

thomasburnside wrote:... 747s have crashed before but you dont see them being grounded. I think the Thunder City Lightnings have proved that one of these aircraft can be flown in civil hands.

I'll fly in a 747 anytime but not in a Thunder City a/c. It might have been flown but the report shows it sure as hell wasn't maintained.

Any organisation which fails to observe regulations is not fit to operate any aircraft. From my reading of the report Thunder City should not have been let lose on a moped let alone an aircraft. Aircraft, regardless of type, must be maintained and operated in accordance with the strict policies and procedures laid down. Where this cannot be done, the aircraft should not be operated.

As a licensed engineer, and ex RAF with Buccaneer Q, I totally Agree with Nigel's post above.
There are too many holes in the cheese
Insufficient training, persons doing tasks for which they were not authorised, and not understanding fully the implications, as in fuel leaking from Pitot probe.

Shameful state of affairs which should have been sorted.

Ttfn

Pete

If only- there were a magic bullet that would keep people from taking the risks of short cutting safety. Something that would go deep into their conscience and reasoning processes to make them stand back -rethink their deduction , and say to their inner self, -No.
No because there will be another day to get it right before they do what ever it is they're doing.
Whether that be flying, speeding while driving, diving into an unknown depth of water, whatever.

Maybe if they added the human costs others will be left to deal with as a final check to the checklist. The loss "they" will suffer for NOT performing the task of inspection diligently.

Which really there is, the first one, although not written on the list, it's- find a reason NOT to fly the plane.

There was an incident sometime ago at my local airport that left us all who were intimate with persons and details
astonished, confused, bewildered.
It's easy in hindsight to say this or that should have been done.
But then, the checks were performed, the risks were assessed, and in the end were deemed acceptable by the pilot.

After much thought, I decided to post a video (not mine) of the aftermath of the incident because Words can not convey the meaning of what I want to say. It is very disturbing to me, and I'm sure it will be to those who have heart for their fellow man who see one in a state of anguish and pain and disbelief.

If ever I saw (and until up to that point in my life I hadn't) someone who was out side of their skin- this was it.

(The pilots daughter was on the airfield but was kept from the plane by others, who knew her, as she was wanting to get her father out of the plane)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=pl ... iz0Etm7rBc


The Pilot was a good man. A law enforcement officer with the PBSO until retiring and taking a job with the FBO as fuel man.
As far as I knew he was regarded as one who didn't take unnecessary risks.
Proving once again, things can happen to anyone, and, the only safe plane is the one that stays on the ground.
RIP Jack.