Bomber Command WWII recollections extracts
Posted: 15 Dec 2020, 10:35
Season to be jolly, and all that, but I feel the need to share this with you.
I've finished reading four books on Bomber Command.
One was an assemblage of facts and figures working up to the "thousand bomber" night raids.
The second was fiction, written from the perspective of P.O.W.s and residents of Dresden, before, during and after the big raid.
Both others were recollections by aircrew involved.
Some points which stood out for me, from the latter two:
INTERESTING
A pilot took violent evasive action to avoid colliding with another Lancaster. After many attempts to avoid it, he was faced with an unavoidable head-on collision. He was stunned to pass through the other bomber, then realised that he had been dodging his own reflection from water droplets.
A Lancaster lost both ailerons, large sections of wing panels, all external aerials, and the use of many instruments, during a savage storm. They made it back to base, but without ASI. The rear gunner was familiar with the wind sound at various speeds, having listened to the cockpit calls during landing. This gunner was able to call his estimates, resulting in a safe landing.
Prior to electronic assistance and marker flares, few bombs landed within five miles of the target. After these advances, many bombs still missed their target by miles. One PFF directed raid on Berlin, missed the city and hit a refugee camp.
DISTRESSING
Some navigation was so poor, that the outgoing aircraft was twenty miles off course before they crossed the English coast. Coming home, some were so far off course, English defences fired on them.
Numerous bombers returned from missions, only to crash in fog in England. This usually resulted in total loss of crew.
Lancasters bombed from several thousand feet higher than Halifaxes and Stirlings. No doubt, separation of the types was considered, but in fact, the lower bombers all too often were bombed themselves.
Aircrews vanished so often that unless they were previously known from training schools, their loss was not dwelt upon. New crews were basically ignored, as inexperienced crews were more prone to be lost. One pilot was known to have obvious shakes until he finished four pints of bitter.
An aircrew threatened to kill their own nose gunner for firing into the cockpit of a nearby Lancaster, whose fate was unkown.That gunner stayed with the same crew, going on to receive a Commission.
A Lancaster pilot observed single white flashes along the Dutch coast, en route to Germany. His only explanation was that 4000lb cookies were being dropped on Holland to lighten the load and allow higher altitude over defended areas. From the colours, he felt that they carried the smaller bombs and incendiaries to the target. He was familiar with the appearance of entire loads being jettisoned by aircraft in trouble.
I've finished reading four books on Bomber Command.
One was an assemblage of facts and figures working up to the "thousand bomber" night raids.
The second was fiction, written from the perspective of P.O.W.s and residents of Dresden, before, during and after the big raid.
Both others were recollections by aircrew involved.
Some points which stood out for me, from the latter two:
INTERESTING
A pilot took violent evasive action to avoid colliding with another Lancaster. After many attempts to avoid it, he was faced with an unavoidable head-on collision. He was stunned to pass through the other bomber, then realised that he had been dodging his own reflection from water droplets.
A Lancaster lost both ailerons, large sections of wing panels, all external aerials, and the use of many instruments, during a savage storm. They made it back to base, but without ASI. The rear gunner was familiar with the wind sound at various speeds, having listened to the cockpit calls during landing. This gunner was able to call his estimates, resulting in a safe landing.
Prior to electronic assistance and marker flares, few bombs landed within five miles of the target. After these advances, many bombs still missed their target by miles. One PFF directed raid on Berlin, missed the city and hit a refugee camp.
DISTRESSING
Some navigation was so poor, that the outgoing aircraft was twenty miles off course before they crossed the English coast. Coming home, some were so far off course, English defences fired on them.
Numerous bombers returned from missions, only to crash in fog in England. This usually resulted in total loss of crew.
Lancasters bombed from several thousand feet higher than Halifaxes and Stirlings. No doubt, separation of the types was considered, but in fact, the lower bombers all too often were bombed themselves.
Aircrews vanished so often that unless they were previously known from training schools, their loss was not dwelt upon. New crews were basically ignored, as inexperienced crews were more prone to be lost. One pilot was known to have obvious shakes until he finished four pints of bitter.
An aircrew threatened to kill their own nose gunner for firing into the cockpit of a nearby Lancaster, whose fate was unkown.That gunner stayed with the same crew, going on to receive a Commission.
A Lancaster pilot observed single white flashes along the Dutch coast, en route to Germany. His only explanation was that 4000lb cookies were being dropped on Holland to lighten the load and allow higher altitude over defended areas. From the colours, he felt that they carried the smaller bombs and incendiaries to the target. He was familiar with the appearance of entire loads being jettisoned by aircraft in trouble.
EricT
EricT
NSW is now facing the same sort of border closures as were put up against Victoria a few months back.