NO!thomasburnside wrote: I think the Thunder City Lightnings have proved that one of these aircraft can be flown in civil hands.
As an ex-AOC postholder, the excerpts from the report below are pretty convincing evidence of an incompetent organisation not in compliance with the regualtions to ensure a safe operation. There are many others in the report equally as bad, if not worse.
I used to admire Thunder City for their work in preserving airworthy these ex-Military aircraft, but the evidence suggests a cowboy outfit and an accident waiting to happen.
They stuck that pilot in an unairworthy, improperly maintained aircraft and with an unserviceable ejection seat. Could alnost say Corporate Manslaughter.
Mind you, he shouldn't have been there anyway as his display authorisation had lapsed.
Thunder City operations were reviewed to determine if the organisation had complied
with applicable regulatory requirements during the air show. The evidence found
indicated that two types (Buccaneer and EE Lightning) aircraft of Thunder City
participated in the air show. Thunder City ability to properly manage the operations of
aircraft and pilot flying were inadequate. The SACAA conducted a renewal audit at
Thunder City on 4 April 2009 and highlighted safety and quality was a problem inside
the organisation. It was determined that Thunder City had no safety and quality policy
in place, thus requested to do the necessary rectification actions within 90 days.
There was no proof that Thunder City complied with the conclusion of the AOC audit
report. Thunder City continued to operate without rectifying the audit findings.
The AMO was required to appoint a person responsible for Quality Control who will
be responsible for matters affecting airworthiness and aviation safety. The evidence
found showed that the AMO did not have a Senior Person (Quality Manager) or
Group of Senior Persons (Quality Inspectors) nominated to be accountable for the
Quality Control System. The result was that the Quality Control activities were
inadequately implemented. The AMO maintenance processes were negatively
affected by the situation.
The AMO was required to ensure that personnel in all technical departments
are of sufficient number, experienced and have been given appropriate
authority to be able to discharge their allocated responsibilities. To ensure
there is full and efficient coordination between departments and within
department in respect of airworthiness matters. Also, the AMO had to ensure
that all maintenance personnel received initial and continuation training which
was appropriate to the assigned tasks and responsibilities. Added too was
that the AMO had to keep up to date all relevant documentation pertaining to
the maintenance personnel. But the evidence found showed that the
identified requirements were not complied with; and that the same noncompliances
were identified in past audit findings.
The AMO was not receiving any technical support from the aircraft
manufacturer. The result was that the AMO became solely responsible for
the aircraft airworthiness. The type was declared obsolete during 1976 by the
manufacturer, which meant that a whole lot of surplus spare parts became
available. Thunder City purchased all the spare parts which they could obtain
from the RAF and kept them in their storage facility. Majority of the parts in
the stores were determined to be beyond their shelf life limit. The AMO
procedure was to carry out a visual inspection of the parts to verify
serviceability prior to fitting. There was stores control problems (e.g. tools
missing and aircraft parts not issued through the store system) which the
AMO clearly had difficulty to adequately manage.
Thunder City’s decision to authorise that the aircraft be operated with deferred
defects. The canopy system inspections which was not carried out. The
ejection seats maintenance that was extended to a later date, to allow
sufficient time to participate in the air show. The explosive cartridges of the
ejection seats which life cycle had expired but were extended to accommodate
the aircraft participating in the air show. The aircraft being operated with an
invalid Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) due to it expiring.
The Accountable Manager, Management Personnel, Certifying Inspectors and all
other role player involved employed by Thunder City AMO were displaying poor
management and workmanship qualities. All the parties were equally responsible for
ensuring that the aircraft was appropriately maintained in accordance with
applicable regulations. They all neglected to identify, analyse and prevent unsafe
conditions in the organisation.
